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MANY CITIES, ONE NATION: A RESPONSE
TO STEVEN SMITH’S PAGANS AND
CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY
BRUCE P. FROHNEN†
Pagans and Christians in the City is a brilliant, important
book that sheds new light on contemporary society’s angry
malaise and bitter debates over public meaning. Through
penetrating analysis of human nature and the inevitable quest
for the sacred in history, Smith provides new insight into modern
man’s
attempt
to,
in
Eric
Voegelin’s
phrase,
“immanentiz[e] . . . the eschaton.”1
Those working to excise
symbols of the transcendent from public life and to remove
Christianity’s “regulatory ideal”2 claim to be liberating
individuals from oppression. In reality, the modern pagan
sacralization of this world chains people to political programs
aimed at refashioning every aspect of our lives to suit current
definitions of the good.
Modern paganism is not merely non-Christian but postChristian, containing within itself attitudes and purposes
developed through Christian culture and society. Consequently,
it cannot escape Christianity’s pursuit of a final resolution to
life’s trials. Instead it merely immanentizes this drive through
pursuit of a historical culmination for terrestrial efforts in a kind
of materialistic beatitude. Within contemporary liberalism this
means ever-greater, ever-broader liberation, in which a redefined
individual will control all aspects of its life, and even its own
definition of life, but always in accordance with contemporary
standards of material equality and social justice.3 The inevitable
conclusion, which Smith is too polite and prudent to make
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1
ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 166
(1952).
2
STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS
FROM THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC 195 (2018) [hereinafter PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS].
3
See generally BRUCE FROHNEN, THE NEW COMMUNITARIANS AND THE CRISIS
OF MODERN LIBERALISM (1996).
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explicit, is summed up by his muse, T.S. Eliot: “If you will not
have God (and He is a jealous God) you should pay your respects
to Hitler or Stalin.”4 When daily life and the state both are not
only valued but fully sacralized, there is no logical stopping point
for political control; the result is stultifying conformity and may
well include mass, murderous violence, whether in the name of
racial dominance, material equality, or protecting individuals
from the terrors of microaggressions.
Smith approaches modern paganism’s totalitarian impulses
somewhat obliquely by noting that the realm of activity deemed
suitable for regulation (in his phrase “the walls of the city”) has
expanded so far into previously private (I would say social) life
that no room is left for religion or any other form of conduct to
escape political control and possible censure.5 The result is not
mere re-paganization. Today’s pagan state is far more effective
and extensive than its predecessors. The Roman state, for
example, was checked and limited by the (often unjust and even
brutal) institution of the paterfamilias. The father was a tyrant
in his own household and this often produced oppression for all
those he ruled, but this tyranny checked and limited the tyranny
of the state.6 Today, the family itself has been made into a
political tool, as Smith shows in his discussion of recent Supreme
Court decisions regarding sexual conduct, especially Obergefell v.
Hodges and its aftermath.7
In his treatment of contemporary legal issues and, more
deeply, his analysis of the manner in which changing religious
assumptions and goals shape the culture from which law
naturally grows, Smith has provided both a strong critique of
contemporary “secular” pieties and an explanation for the culture
wars so often derided or minimized by those most determined to
4

T.S. ELIOT, THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY 80–81 (1948).
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 339–40.
6
The following funeral inscription illustrates the importance of the station of
paterfamilias:
By my good conduct I heaped virtues on the virtues of my clan; I begat a
family and sought to equal the exploits of my father. I upheld the praise of
my ancestors, so that they are glad that I was created of their line. My
honors have ennobled my stock.
4 E.H. WARMINGTON, REMAINS OF OLD LATIN 2–9 (1940), in 1 ROMAN CIVILIZATION
524 (Naphtali Lewis and Meyer Reinhold eds., 3d ed., 1990). Justinian also
emphasized male control over his immediate family and his wards. JUSTINIAN,
INSTITUTES, i, ix, in 2 ROMAN CIVILIZATION 341 (Naphtali Lewis and Meyer
Reinhold eds., 3d ed., 1990).
7
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 274.
5
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deconstruct traditional culture. Still, I would argue that Smith’s
wide-ranging, radical rethinking of contemporary social disorder
does not go far enough. As Smith’s discussion of contemporary
judicial treatment of social structure makes clear, today’s legal
elites are at heart totalitarian in their concern to reshape all of
society and all of human nature and belief. Theirs is a concern
with the very nature of our character as humans. As such they
are operating, often overtly, as lawgivers; they seek to re-found
the social order in accordance with their own conception of the
good and their own regulatory means and ends. Lawgiving at
heart is not a legal but a political act in that it seeks to make a
people through law, rather than make particular laws to suit a
given people. In practical terms, it requires the concentration of
power in the hands of some one or few persons claiming the right
and wisdom to determine the proper character of the people and
how to achieve it.8
Such projects for centuries have been associated with the
early modern political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli—in some
ways the founder of modern political science. In particular,
Machiavelli was convinced that political rulers, whether princes
or republican leaders, must stamp out various forms of
“corruption,” by which he meant loyalties standing in the way of
state power and influence.9
Machiavelli’s self-conscious

8
It should come as no surprise that the god-like role of the lawgiver has ancient
roots, going back to ancient conceptions of the king as creator of literal as well as
legal order out of chaos. See BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT ch.
1 (7th ed., 2015). Plato also seems to harbor an aversion to the rule of law as an
obstacle to “wise rule,” wherein the ruler with “expertise” commands without
mediation:
And whether they [i.e. the ruler(s)] purge the city for its benefit by putting
some people to death or else by exiling them, or whether again they make it
smaller by sending out colonies somewhere like swarms of bees, or build it
up by introducing people from somewhere outside and making them
citizens—so long as they act to preserve it on the basis of expert knowledge
and what is just, making it better than it was so far as they can, this is the
constitution which alone we must say is correct, under these conditions and
in accordance with criteria of this sort.
PLATO, STATESMAN 293d-e (C.J. Rowe trans.), in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 337
(John M. Cooper ed., 1997).
9
J.G.A. Pocock discusses, as an example, the threat to the state Machiavelli
perceived in the castle-holding lords outside of cities. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 209–11. In a similar way, Machiavelli, as well as his
intellectual descendants, distrust [Catholic] Christianity, because “it taught men to
give themselves to ends other than the city’s and to love their own souls more than
the fatherland.” Id. at 202.
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resuscitation of ancient notions of virtue also was a rejection of
the idea that subjects and citizens might be loyal to associations
other than the city without becoming enemies of the state.10
My concern is that Smith’s analysis remains wedded to the
prejudices of this early modern political science, most especially
its monistic conception of political society and its sovereignty. In
its very title, “Pagans and Christians in the City” this book
furthers the modern error of assuming societies, and indeed
civilizations, can be summed up in terms of a single unit. In so
doing, and despite some bows toward individual conscience and
religious community, Smith fails to question in any full sense the
modern view that there must be some center of power and
authority, some single, particular common source of authority
and definition of the common good. Along this line, Smith
defends the vision of “a city or a political community that
respects and is open to transcendence” and laments repudiation
of “the generically, implicitly Christian city that Americans have
inherited.”11 But societies—in contemporary terms nations—are
not cities, and to equate a city with a political community today
is to perpetuate that longstanding, mistaken view that political
structures, and especially the nation-state, are the sole proper
locus of affection and loyalty; that the nation is a community
rather than a collection of smaller, more natural and
fundamental associations.
I’ve stated this criticism much too baldly. Smith’s repetition
of the “Whig” version of history, in which religion and community
are shucked off over time to make way for a liberated
individualism, clearly is told in part as a means of elucidating
the origins of today’s atavistic atomism. Still, some of these
assumptions underly his discussion of debates over religious
freedom in America and so are worth questioning. In particular,
as we confront modern paganism’s totalitarian impulses, it is
good to remember the limits of Christian political claims. For
example, Augustine, and later Thomas Aquinas, advised against
too vigorous a pursuit of the good in this life, for example by
sanctioning practices like prostitution, because he recognized the
inevitability of sin, the limits of law, and the damage done to

10
11

See, e.g., id. at 202, 210–11.
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 303.
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society through political overreaching.12 Through the process of
re-paganization, then, we are not merely exchanging one totalist
vision of society for another, but replacing a more limited, hence
intrinsically more tolerant, notion for one that, perhaps
ironically, lacks the will or ability to tolerate multiple loyalties or
deep dissent over the long term.
The absolutist strain of politics mis-identified with Medieval
Europe is an early modern invention based on a mis-reading of
ancient examples and aimed at solidifying the nation-state. It
undermines that multiplicity of authorities, including legal
jurisdictions, at the heart of ordered liberty, including, of course,
religious liberty.13
Aristotle argued that the polis—today
mistranslated as “city-state” but actually meaning “citycommunity”—requires a kind of friendship dependent on
commonality. Aristotle’s city-communities—Athens, Sparta, and
so on—were tight-knit, tribal groupings fighting for survival and
dominance in a pitiless world. They were total communities in
which freedom, slavery, and structures of life down to whether
the people would eat in their homes or at common messes, were
considered issues of crucial public importance. 14 Many good
things came from the polis but limited government, ordered
liberty, and the rule of law were not among them. As to the
modern rebirth of the polis, that way lies the revolutionary terror
of the guillotine.15
Less oddly than might seem, the alternative to the allencompassing polis is the nation. Aristotle described the nation
as the alternative to the city-community; his nation was of a
particular sort, however, in that he described the nation in terms
and in reference to ancient empires—that is, as an alliance made
up of smaller, more natural associations.16 Rome attempted to
maintain the nature of a city while running an empire. Over the
long run this attempt failed to work for the republic or,
12
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, Q. 10, art. 11 (English
Dominican Friars eds., The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine,
2012).
13
See generally BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, SOVEREIGNTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
POLITICAL GOOD (J.F. Huntington, trans., 1997) (1957).
14
1 GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 278–81 (1987).
15
For the excesses of the leaders of Revolutionary France against individuals
and entire cities viewed harmful to the patrie, see SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A
CHRONICAL OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 783–86, 789–92 (1989).
16
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1276a 26–31. Aristotle, Politics 64 (Stephen Everson
ed., B. Jowett trans., 1996) (noting the difference between a Greek polis as a single
city-state and the comparatively immense Babylon).
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eventually, the empire itself. That said, it is worth remembering
that the Roman Empire lasted as long as it did by providing
maximum autonomy to local peoples’ associations and
institutions. Formerly independent kingdoms might retain the
bulk of their previous way of life by surrendering control over
their foreign policy to Rome and, of course, paying tribute.17
Over time, Christendom replaced Rome as an empire of
empires—a complex network of overlapping and even competing
legal and political jurisdictions rooted in local ties. Through most
of its history the United States fit, in broad terms, this imperial
pattern and thereby allowed for religious, spiritual, and political
liberty of a kind not found in Rome or any ancient city. That
imperial pattern of nationhood sometimes goes by the name
“federalism,” but only federalism of the kind practiced during the
early republic—that is, one that in contemporary terms would be
One prominent,
deemed a strict, locality-centered sort.18
indicative example is provided by that strict constructionist,
Thomas Jefferson. In a letter to James Madison, Jefferson
predicted a successful expansion of the American union in any
conflict with European power; with such an eventuality, “we
should have such an empire for liberty as [the world] has never
surveyed since the creation: & I am persuaded no constitution
was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire &
self government.”19 The loosely-structured American republic,
precisely because of its loose structure, was capable of fostering
self-government over a wide geographic expanse—of becoming an
extensive “empire for liberty.”
The paradigm within which Smith operates is of “one nation
under God”—in which “the determination of what the
transcendent authority demands will be left to individuals.”20
Smith himself criticizes what little discipline exists in Supreme
Court treatment of individual claims of conscience on the
17
The trial of Jesus furnishes an example of the Roman Empire’s respect for the
law of the peoples over which it “ruled.” See Luke 23:6-11 (Douay-Rheims) (Wherein
Pilate realizes that Jesus belongs to the jurisdiction of Herod and sends Jesus to
him).
18
Note that even the supposedly “pro-federalism” argument of the Supreme
Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) accepts that Congress has the
power to regulate activities that are not themselves interstate commerce but merely
affect it.
19
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, (Apr. 27, 1809), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES 4 MARCH 1809 TO 15
NOVEMBER 1809, 169 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2004).
20
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 326.
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grounds that it establishes a “sovereign community” in the zone
of religious freedom, denying religious accommodation on
political grounds.21 This is to misread the nature of religion and
constitutionalism in the United States from before the founding
through the nineteenth century and, in much of the country, to
this day.
The word “religion” derives from a root meaning “to bind,”
and, as adopted by the medieval, it referred in particular to
religious and liturgical life.22 It is a social and communal as
much as an individual and theological institution and practice.
This fact was recognized at the founding when Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and New Hampshire all implemented a plan of
religious assessments (legislatively enacted but not implemented
in Maryland and Georgia, rejected after vigorous debate in
Virginia) that taxed all citizens for the support of religion. The
result was not established churches as generally understood, but
rather support for religious communities as each citizen directed
his tax monies to the church of his choice.23 The battle over local
“establishments” was long and contested, involving as it did
hatred of Catholics, frontier reliance on limited clerical resources,
and the rise of a nationalizing civil religion.24 It was not
definitively “won” by nationalist secularizers until incorporation
of the religion clause by the Supreme Court beginning with its
decision in Everson v. Board of Education.25
Smith certainly is not ignorant of the necessity of limitations
on power for ordered liberty, or of the development of religious
freedom in part, at least, through the maintenance of multiple
foci of power. He rightly points out how the so-called papal
revolution of the early Middle Ages, separating religious and
secular jurisdictions, fostered growth of the rule of law. But I
wish he had taken more seriously the importance of overlapping
and competing jurisdictions for the development of
constitutionalism as shown by Harold Berman and Kenneth

21

Id. at 327.
William T. Cavanaugh, “A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House”: The
Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State, 11 MOD. THEOLOGY 397, 404 (1995).
23
See Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the American Republic: Religion
and the State Governments, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/rel
igion/rel05.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
24
See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (4th
prtg. 2004) (2002).
25
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
22
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Pennington, among others.26 As it is, he presents a simplified
“two-swords” version that repeats the Whig fallacy of a march
toward secular individualism; the notion of two separate but
equal powers—the ecclesiastical and the secular—captures only
part of the mesh of contending powers that was medieval
Europe.27 To begin, the two-swords theory ceded to secular
authorities the power to make laws for religious as well as
political institutions and persons.28
The Church in early
Christian Europe was dominated by secular authorities and
purposes to the point that it could not be said to have wielded
any separate power.29 In continuity with pagan practice, kings
were in essence tribal leaders, chief judges of their peoples, and
sacred rulers superior to clerics of all ranks and types.30 But the
institutional separation achieved over time was neither clean nor
along any strict, “sacred-secular” line; there were more than two
jurisdictions of law, more than two levels and loci of political
authority, even, showing how mistaken contemporary claims of
the inevitability of modern sovereignty truly are.31 Conflicts over
the extent (and temporal length) of the right of sanctuary,
definitions of the ecclesiastical sphere, and the reach of royal,
merchant, and local laws all enhanced the ability of persons and
communities to carve out room for self-government.32
The history of the Medieval Church is filled with evidence of
the connections between liberty and the multiplicity of
associations, each with important rights. Cathedral chapters
competed with Bishops for power and funds; domestic houses,
diocese, and even the Church as a whole all were treated at law
as corporations with their own chartered as well as intrinsic
rights, which often came in conflict and required adjudication.

26

See, e.g., KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW (1993); HAROLD
J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION (1983).
27
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 311–15.
28
BERMAN, supra note 26, at 92.
29
Id. at 88.
30
Id. at 89.
31
For the role of cities in this patchwork of jurisdictions, see id. at 395; for the
development of institutional checks on monarchs through charters, see id. at 501–
05. See also David J. Bederman, Diversity and Permeability in Transnational
Governance, 57 EMORY L.J. 201, 213 (2007).
32
See generally Bruce P. Frohnen, The One and the Many: Individual Rights,
Corporate Rights and the Diversity of Groups, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 789 (2005).
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And the corporation with a higher position within the supposedly
unquestioned, absolute hierarchy was not always on the winning
side of such litigation.33
In the American context as well, Smith repeats the monist
fallacy. Focusing on Madison and Jefferson he presents a picture
of religious liberty as a conflict between the individual and the
(usually political) community.34 The Jeffersonian vision, so
sacred to today’s elites, was aimed only at the “general”
government, not intended to interfere with state and local
practices.35 Moreover, even as regards the federal government,
Jefferson’s vision was only one, extreme take on religious
liberty.36 It was not reflected, for example, in the abiding
recognition of Christianity as part of the common law of
American jurisdictions through the nineteenth century,37 of
American courts’ insistence on upholding laws against
blasphemy,38 or of the decision in the case of Reynolds v. United
States39 (noted by Smith) upholding America’s Christian cultural
character and foundation in monogamous marriage. Smith’s
focus on the Jeffersonian vision in opposition to the mainstream
of legal and constitutional practice privileges liberalism’s
individual/state binary, hiding the role of federalism in
maintaining religious community and liberty in creative tension.
The connections among a diversity of authorities, the
consequent political liberty, and religious liberty are both deep
and close. It was not federalism as a merely structural entity
that allowed for associational and especially religious liberty in
the United States. Administrative decentralization in the United
States, like that in Medieval Europe, encouraged a diversity of
faiths and institutions at the local level along with a more

33

See Rights and the Cathedral Chapter, in CHARLES REID, RIGHTS IN
THIRTEENTH-CENTURY CANON LAW: AN HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION (May 1995)
(unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with author). For a
discussion of how this corporate understanding related to secular law and rights as
well, see Brian Tierney, Religion and Rights: A Medieval Perspective, 5 J.L. &
RELIGION 163, 170 (1987).
34
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 326–27.
35
See, e.g., Jefferson’s Second Inaugural Address and Letter to Reverend Samuel
Miller, in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 530–31 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark
David Hall eds., 2010) [hereinafter THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE].
36
See id. at ch. 13
37
See, e.g., Joseph Story, Christianity a Part of the Common Law, in THE
SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 35, at 551–52.
38
See, e.g., People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. 1811).
39
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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general spirit of local self-government. As Alexis de Tocqueville
pointed out, liberty is lived at a level more local than either the
federal or the state. It is participation in political life that gives
people the capacity and the desire to both protect selfgovernment and to make it work. What this meant in the
American context was a streak of independence rooted in
practical life within family, church, and a variety of local
associations, fostering a “science of association.”40 It was this
science which allowed Americans to put into practice the Puritan
combination of the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty.41
The spirit of religion was necessary for the spirit of liberty
because it maintained a moral order within each person’s soul
and within the community as a whole, in large measure by
recognizing each person’s natural propensity to form
associations.42
The bulk of Smith’s discussion of religion understandably
concerns post-Civil War developments.
Unfortunately, he
accepts the cultural and political presumptions underlying
contemporary readings of the Fourteenth Amendment. One need
hold no brief for racism to recognize the limits of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s intended reach, or to recognize the radical
implications of the revisionist history thereof.43 Smith’s largely
individualist response to the problems of religion clause
jurisprudence rests on acceptance of incorporation—the
foundation of the nationalized church of secularism and
individual conscience. It may be necessary for a practicing
lawyer to accept the reality of incorporation, but to understand
the roots of today’s angry malaise requires recognition that the
destruction of federalism was central to this development.
It is in the area of civil religion that Smith’s analysis
becomes most troubling. He relies on Robert Bellah’s definition
of civil religion as a set of rituals and norms binding Americans
together as a nation.44 Bellah’s goal was a national community—
a self-evidently contradictory concept—on the basis of beliefs that
on even cursory inspection are simply political. He demanded
40
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 492 (Harvey C. Mansfield
& Delba Winthrop trans. and eds., 2000).
41
Id. at 43.
42
Id. at 89–90.
43
The classic response to such revisionism remains RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (2d. ed., 1997) (1977).
44
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 295.
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socialism as the true message of his version of Christianity. In
brief, Bellah sought to immanentize the eschaton in an allencompassing national edifice held together by political and legal
forces. Smith’s choice of Bellah as an exemplar of a lost vision of
the Christian city is deeply unfortunate.
Again, my criticism no doubt appears more harsh than I
intend. There is much in Smith’s narrative to show that he is
presenting the rise of a problematic individualism and that this
rise is in opposition to something deeper and more
communitarian.45 Still, Smith’s references to his The Agnostic
Constitution show a troubling lack of concern with the role of
federalism and local communalism in understanding religion’s
role in American public life.46 It is true that religion increasingly
has come to mean simple individual “conscience” to the exclusion
of transcendent standards of belief and conduct.47 At least as
important, however, has been the undermining of constitutional
religious “agnosticism” through the destruction of meaningful
federalism, splintering not just the constitutional structure, but
the cultural reality it was intended to protect.
The “agnostic constitution” was agnostic only because and to
the extent that the mechanisms of the national government were
set upon and intended primarily to protect the more natural,
local, and specifically religion-based societies existing within the
states and their localities. When the many cities in our states
came to be seen as interlopers competing for attention and
affection belonging to one, sacred nation, their religions also
came to be seen as enemies of a single, common, and
overwhelmingly political culture. This was the point at which
religious practice was brought under federal control so that it
might be contained, shaped, and eventually forced out of the
public mind. From a variety of accommodations we were pushed
into a situation where lawyers were called upon to define a
precise divide between religious and secular life to the detriment
of both, as the one was forced out of public space and the other
sought with increasing desperation to make beatitude achievable
within history.
Whether in Christendom or within the cities of the American
states, genuine religious community, rooted in transcendent
standards and beliefs, brought conflict as well as cooperation.
45
46
47

Id. at 312.
Id. at 295–96.
Id. at 330.
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But this conflict bred freedom and self-government because it
limited the reach and effectiveness of any centralized authority.
It also bred genuine religious belief and conduct because that
belief mattered to public as well as private life and was treated
as foundational and a worthy subject of strong debate. The
“dissidence of dissent”48 that brought about the American
Revolution fostered a society of overlapping and competing
cultures, jurisdictions, and beliefs.
It ruled out certain
practices—most prominently polygamy. It allowed for a wide
variety of beliefs and ways of life. When it was stifled by
nationalizing forces and laws the religious spirit was stifled as
well.49
In brief, I wish Steve Smith in what in many ways is a
masterful work had integrated into it the understanding that
centralization itself is the enemy of liberty, including religious
liberty, and that modern political religion, with its commitment
to fundamental transformation, does not merely sacralize daily
life, it stakes a claim to the sacred nature of its own political
program, degrading the status, importance, and safety of
religious (and other) associations. Centralized power by nature
is a danger to freedom and responsibility because it establishes
tyranny in the old sense of a political leader’s ability to act
according to will rather than law.50
The danger of centralization is real within religious as well
as political associations. Here I would reference in particular
current scandals within the Catholic church, which many have
traced to errors they believe made their way into canon law and
church administration following on Vatican I. Whatever one
makes of the necessity and wisdom of some of these changes, it is
important to note that the church before that time was
significantly decentralized and that laymen actually had more
influence on and ability to check ecclesiastical power before the
revised canon law of 1917 put the clergy and the hierarchy in
particular beyond the reach of most counter-influences within
and among the associations making up that church.51

48

EDMUND BURKE, SPEECH ON CONCILIATION WITH AMERICA 22 (Hammond
Lamont ed., 1897).
49
See generally ROBERT NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY (Intercollegiate
Studies Institute 2010) (1953).
50
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
51
See generally Bronwen McShea, Bishops Unbound: The History Behind
Today’s Crisis of Church Leadership, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 2019, at 33.
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It may (or may not) be the case that “we can’t turn back the
clock” toward a more decentralized understanding of both church
and state. But it seems wise to remember, as we face everincreasing demands for greater centralization of power in the
name of social justice that the justice of free self-government was
borne of decentralization.

